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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Tyson Lee Buss appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post 
conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Underlvina Criminal Proceedinas 
Buss shot and killed an unarmed man in a dispute over a $150.00 drug debt. 
(#30499 Sent. Tr., p.69, Ls.11-19; #30499 PSI, pp.1-2.) The circumstances leading 
to the killing were as follows: A lady named Shelly paid $150.00 dollars for Buss to 
get her some methamphetamine. (#30499 Sent. Tr., p.69, Ls.11-13.) Shelly told a 
friend, a forty-year-old man named Dwight Thompson, that Buss had not delivered 
the methamphetamine or returned the money. (#30499 Sent. Tr., p.69, Ls.14-19.) 
Mr. Thompson later observed Buss walking along Boulevard Street in Idaho Falls 
and confronted him about the money: 
Mr. Thompson approached the Defendant [Buss] that night 
about some money that was owed to a friend. This took place on 
Boulevard at 9:45. 
Mr. Thompson saw him walking on the street, he stopped his 
car, he got out. We don't know what was actually said, but we 
know it happened very quickly. The gun came out and at that point 
witnesses would have testified that Mr. Thompson made some 
remarks such as, "What's the gun doing out, what are you going to 
have to do, where's the money, shoot me." The whole event lasted 
90 seconds or less. 
(#30499 Sent. Tr., p.49, ~s.10-21.') Buss was charged with murder in the first 
degree, enhanced for his use of a deadly weapon to commit the crime. (#30499 R., 
pp.22-23.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Buss entered an Alford plea to an amended 
charge of voluntary manslaughter also enhanced for his use of a deadly weapon to 
commit the crime. (#30499 R., pp.28-29; 35-39.) Buss received a unified thirty-year 
sentence with sixteen years fixed. (#30499 R., pp.48-51.) 
Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Shortly after he was sentenced, Buss filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 
(#33180 R., p.28.) The state moved for summary dismissal and a hearing was held. 
(#33180 R., p.28.) At the hearing on the state's motion, Buss requested he be 
allowed to withdraw his petition. (#33180 R., p.28; Exhibit, Audio Recording of 
10/27/05 Hr'g.) The court heard argument on the motion but also considered Buss's 
request to withdraw his petition. (Audio Recording of 10/27/05 Hr'g.) Construing the 
request as a motion to dismiss and, citing Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41, the 
district court granted the motion without ruling on the substance of the petition. 
(#33180 R., p.28; Audio Recording of 10/27/05 Hr'g.) 
Seven months later, Buss filed another petition for post-conviction relief. 
(#33180 R., pp.3-10.) In that petition Buss's sole claim was ineffective assistance of 
counsel. (#33180 R., p.4.) In support of that claim Buss made the following 
' As observed by the district court, Buss was 5'7" and 170 pounds and the forty- 
year-old Mr. Thompson was 5'11" and 175 pounds. (#30499 Sent. Tr., p.69, Ls.20- 
22 .) 
assertions: 1) "I [Buss] asked for any and all witness statements which I never 
received along with much more of my discovery"; 2) "During the time of plea 
agreement I was on drugs & Brent Allison [Buss's attorney] wouldn't give me a 
sufficient amount of time to think about my Plea agreement or talk to my family"; 3) 
"Brent Allison told me there was no self defense or justifiable homicide in Idaho. 
This is how I was coerced into a plea bargan"; and 4) "1 told Brent that I wasn't guilty 
of this crime! He told me it doesn't matter. Its what you can prove I told him I 
wouldn't plead guilty. He said they would find me guilty if I took it to trial because 
there is no self defense. Then told me to plead Alford that it means, I'm not 
admitting guilty, but they would find me guilty. I know that there is self defense now 
& I think I was miss represented." (#33180 R., p.5-6 (spelling and grammar as in 
original).) 
The state moved to dismiss Buss's petition, and a hearing was held on the 
motion. (#33180 R., pp.23-27.) At that hearing, the state first argued that Buss's 
second petition was a successive petition improperly before the court a second time. 
(4/06/06 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-20.) The prosecutor also argued the record affirmatively 
disproved all of Buss's ineffective assistance of counsel arguments except for the 
assertion that his attorney told Buss that self-defense was not applicable in Idaho: 
"So basically, those responses made under oath [at the change of plea hearing] do, 
in fact, negate those allegations. The only allegation that is it not specifically and 
directly negated is the one that the Court has concern, and that is with regard to the 
self-defense issue." (4106106 Tr., p.8, Ls.20-24.) 
With regard to the self-defense issue, the state asserted Buss had not 
presented facts that supported a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because 
he failed to allege that he was prejudiced by counsel's actions. (4106106 Tr., p.19, 
Ls.2-21.) The district court, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, assumed Buss had been incorrectly advised that self-defense was 
not applicable in Idaho. (4105106 Tr., p.16, Ls.11-16.) The district court focused on 
the prejudice prong of Strickland -- whether the attorney's wrongful advice 
prejudiced Buss: 
I've kind of come to the conclusion that for the purposes of this 
hearing, I'm going to assume he was wrongfully advised. That may 
not be the end result, but I'm going to do that. 
The question then becomes, assuming he was wrongly 
advised, has he addressed whether or not he had a legitimate self- 
defense argument? 
(4106106 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 13-1 9.) 
In response to the district court's questioning of whether Buss provided facts 
supporting prejudice -- whether self-defense was even an issue -- Buss's counsel 
responded: 
MR. STOSICH: And I would have to say to the Court that he hasn't 
done that [stated facts supporting self-defense] to fully notify that 
these are the reasons that I believe self-defense was available to 
him. 
THE COURT: That's my concern. 
MR. STOSICH: I think that that's true under the petition. 
(4106106 Tr., p.16, Ls.13-19.) The district court took the matter under advisement 
and issued a written order summarily dismissing Buss's petition. (4106106 Tr., p.19, 
Ls.22-25; #33180 R., pp.28-43.) 
In a memorandum decision, the district court granted the state's motion for 
summary dismissal on three independent bases: 1) that the second post-conviction 
petition was an improper successive petition (#33180 R., pp.30-32); 2) Buss's 
second petition was barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion (#33180 R., pp.32- 
33); and 3) that "even if Buss's claims concerning [ineffective assistance ofj trial 
counsel are true, he has failed to establish that, but for trial counsel's deficient 
performance, there is a reasonable probability that Buss would not have pled guilty 
to the crimes charged" (#33180 R., p.33). 
Buss filed a timely appeal. (#33180 R., pp.47-50.) 
ISSUES 
Buss states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Buss's petition for 
post-conviction relief where the district court determined that the 
petition was barred by I.C. 19-4908, but erroneously 
determined that Mr. Buss had previously knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waived the issues raised? 
2. Did the district court err when it dismissed, sua sponfe, and 
without prior notice, Mr. Buss's post-conviction petition based 
upon the doctrine of issue preclusion despite the fact that the 
prior adjudication relied upon by the district court was not a final 
determination of the merits of Mr. Buss's petition, and was not 
an appealable order? 
3. Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Buss's claim that 
his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered 
in light of his attorney's affirmative misrepresentation of the 
avaiiability of the affirmative defenses of self-defense or 
justifiable homicide in Idaho. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 9.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1 Should this Court reject Buss's claim that notice was inadequate where Buss 
has shown no prejudice or surprise from the alleged lack of notice and had 
the opportunity to address any deficiencies in his petition at a hearing where 
the deficiencies were addressed? 
2. The district court ultimately granted the state's motion for summary dismissal 
on the basis that the petition did not set forth facts supporting a theoiy of self- 
defense and therefore failed to show how his counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced him. It is incontrovertible that Buss's petition does not set forth 
facts supporting a theory of self-defense and Buss conceded this at the 
hearing and presented no additional facts supporting such a theory. Has 
Buss, therefore, failed to show from the record that the district court erred in 
summarily dismissing his petition? 
ARGUMENT 
The Record Supports The District Court's Order Of Summarv Dismissal On The 
Merits Of BUSS'S Petition 
A. Introduction 
Buss claims the district court erred for three reasons. First, Buss claims the 
court erred when it dismissed his second petition as being successive. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.10-17.) Second, Buss claims the district court erred when it found the 
issues raised in Buss's second petition were barred by the doctrine of issue 
preclusion. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-29.) Third, Buss claims the district court erred 
when it "dismissed Mr. Buss's claim that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily entered in light of his attorney's affirmative misrepresentation of the 
availability of the affirmative defenses of self defense or justifiable homicide in 
Idaho." (Appellant's Brief, p.29 (capitalization removed).) 
Because there was no adjudication of the merits of Buss's first petition and no 
dismissal with prejudice, the state agrees Buss's present petition is not procedurally 
barred as a successive petition or per the doctrine of issue preclusion. 
Nevertheless, the district court properly dismissed Buss's petition on the merits 
because his petition did not set forth facts showing how the claimed deficient 
performance -- allegedly misinforming Buss on the law -- resulted in prejudice. 
Furthermore, Buss was provided adequate notice of this deficiency in the state's 
motion and to the extent that he was not, that claim is not preserved because he 
proceeded to hearing. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from a summary dismissal of a petition, the appellate court reviews 
the record to determine if an issue of material fact exists, in which case an 
evidentiary hearing is required. Wilson v. State, 133 ldaho 874, 877-78, 993 P.2d 
1205, 1208-09 (Ct. App. 2000). "The issue on appeal from a dismissal is whether 
the petition alleges facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief." 
Matthews v. State, 122 ldaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992). The court is 
not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. 
v. State, 135 ldaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). 
C. Buss's Claim That He Received Inadequate Notice Of The Grounds For 
Summary Dismissal Is Without Merit 
ldaho Code fi 19-4906 authorizes a district court to summarily dismiss a post- 
conviction petition upon motion by a party or on the court's own initiative. Workman 
v. State, 144 ldaho 518, ---, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007). When a court dismisses an 
application sua sponfe, the court is required by ldaho Code § 19-4906(b) to give the 
petitioner notice of the reasons for its contemplated dismissal and a 20-day 
opportunity to respond. Workman, 144 ldaho at ---, 164 P.3d at 803; 
Savkhamchone v. State, 127 ldaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995); Banks v. 
State, 123 ldaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993). However, where the state files a 
motion for summary disposition pursuant to ldaho Code § 19-4906(c), there is no 20- 
day notice requirement because "'the motion itself serves as notice that summary 
dismissal is being sought."' Workman, 144 ldaho at ---, 164 P.3d at 804 (quoting 
Savkhamchone, 127 ldaho at 322, 900 P.2d at 798). As long as the state's motion 
puts the petitioner on notice of the basis for the state's request that the petition be 
summarily dismissed, the district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing 
or provide the petitioner with advance notice before dismissing the petition pursuant 
to the state's motion. Workman, 144 ldaho at ---, 164 P.3d at 804. 
Buss claims the district court "sua sponte dismissed [his] claim for lack of 
evidence . . . . " (Appellant's Brief, p.34.) The state's motion failed to notify him that 
his petition did not articulate facts supporting prejudice, i&x, facts that would have 
supported a claim of self-defense. (Appellant's Brief, p.34.) This claim is not 
supported by the record. 
Buss's petition claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. (#33180 R., pp.3- 
10.) Buss's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fit into two categories: 1) the 
entry of the plea, and 2) Buss's claim that his attorney misinformed him of the law of 
self-defense in ldaho. The brief filed in support of the state's motion for summary 
dismissal identified two independent bases for dismissing Buss's petition. First, the 
state identified what it believed to be the successive nature of the petition. Next, the 
state argued that there was "no evidentiary basis to support [Buss's] claims." 
(#33180 R., p.23.) In support of this claim, the state cited Small v. State, 132 ldaho 
327, 331, 971 P.2d 11 51, 1155 (Ct. App. 1999) -- a post-conviction case in which the 
petitioner failed to articulate an evidentiary basis for ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Consequently, although state's motion primarily focused on the 
successive nature of the petition and the fact that the plea colloquy affirmatively 
disproved Buss's claims regarding the entry of the plea, the motion also made clear 
that Buss failed to meet his burden of setting forth fact supporting his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel -- deficient performance and prejudice. 
D. Even if The State's Motion Was Not Sufficient, Buss Failed To Preserve His 
Notice Claim By Proceedins To A Hearina On The Motion 
Even if this Court determines that the state's motion did not put Buss on 
notice of the reason for dismissal, Buss's failure to challenge the adequacy of the 
notice in the district court, despite the opportunity to do so, constitutes a waiver of 
his claim that he received inadequate notice. 
It is a well-established principle of appellate law that, absent fundamental 
error, the failure to raise an issue before the trial court waives that issue for 
purposes of appeal. State v. McAwav, 127 ldaho 54, 60, 896 P.2d 962, 968 (1995); 
State v. Martin, 119 ldaho 577, 808 P.2d j322 (1991). In this case, Buss, 
represented by counsel, proceeded through the post-conviction process, which 
included a hearing on the state's motion, without ever objecting to the adequacy of 
the notice provided by the state's motion. If Buss's counsel was confused or unclear 
about the bases of the very motion upon which the hearing was held he could have 
notified the state and the court of that fact either in a response to the state's motion 
or at the motion hearing itself. A review of the record shows he did neither. Rather, 
counsel chose to proceed on the notice he was provided. 
At the hearing the court incontrovertibly heard argument on the very issue of 
which he claims he was not provided notice. A review of the record shows that 
defense counsel understood the deficiency and that the court believed that Buss had 
not met his burden: 
THE COURT: Well, I think, and he may not have used that 
language, but I construed that to be the substance of his argument, 
that there are no facts supporting the self-defense claim. 
MR. STOSICH: And the state may very well get a court in a trial to 
agree with that, but apparently Mr. Buss believes that not 
withstanding the articulation of the facts in the Alford plea and any 
discussions he may have had with defense counsel, he didn't 
believe that he was adequately advised of the self-defense angle. 
And self-defense, as the court knows, particularly in review of the 
Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, knows that self-defense is a term 
of art, not just a vague theory that can be assumed we know the 
elements of. In fact, it's the state who has to provide evidence that 
self-defense was not a defense and that certainly wasn't -- under 
the jury instruction, and that certainly wasn't done in the Alford plea. 
So I -- 
THE COURT: Don't we have a different situation when we're 
talking about postconviction relief? Doesn't the burden of 
persuasion, as well as producing evidence, fall upon the petitioner 
in this case? 
MR. STOSICH: Oh, absolutely. But in a motion for summary 
dismissal, the Court has to construe the facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. So Mr. Buss has raised the 
issue that he didn't believe he was fully advised and so even -- I 
mean, it's going to be up to how you construe the facts raised in the 
Alford plea, Your Honor, whether or not you believe that Mr. BUSS' 
claims can withstand, viewed in the light most favorable to him, 
whether he should have a full trial on these facts rather than a 
summary dismissal. 
I agree. We have the burden of proof in proving he was advised 
ultimately in a trial of facts. But in a motion for summary dismissal, 
I think the burden is the State's to say, under these facts, we 
believe that Mr. Buss' claims can't survive even that scrutiny. 
THE COURT: Would you agree with me that there are really two 
issues here? One, what he was advised, and, two, whether there 
was a legitimate basis for the self-defense claim? You kind of 
mixed those in your discussion here. 
MR. STOSICH: Yeah, you know, that's a real elemental issue. 
Yes, I agree with what you're saying, Your Honor. I agree that is 
ultimately what Mr. Buss will have to prove, that first he was 
advised -- or he wasn't advised -- thanks -- he wasn't advised and 
that he had a legitimate claim for self-defense in order for a 
postconviction relief inadequate, you know, representation. 
THE COURT: Doesn't he have to do that at this hearing, also? 
MR. STOSICH: Well -- 
THE COURT: Doesn't he have to address both issues? 
MR. STOSICH: Yes. I think in order -- I think he's done that in his 
petition, however, by saying that Mr. Allison did not advise him. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's the first issue. 
MR. STOSICH: Okay, Yes. 
THE COURT: Remember I separated them. And at this point, 
based on my question with Mr. Bevilacqua, I've kind of come to the 
conclusion that for the purposes of this hearing, I'm going to 
assume he was wrongfully advised. That may not be the end 
result, but I'm going to do that. 
The question then becomes, assuming he was wrongfully advised, 
has he addressed whether or not he had a legitimate self-defense 
argument? 
MR. STOSICH: And I would have to say to the Court that he hasn't 
done that to fully notify that these are the reasons that I believe 
self-defense was available to him. 
THE COURT: That's my concern. 
MR. STOSICH: I think that that's true under the petition. 
THE COURT: All right. Did you want to address any of the other 
five issues? 
(4106106 Tr., p.13, L.22 - p.17, L.3.) 
This questioning between the court and defense counsel establishes two 
important points. First, the evidentiary issue was raised in the state's motion for 
summary dismissal (4106106 Tr., p.13, Ls.22-25) and, second, the deficiency of 
Buss's petition was addressed by the court and counsel at the hearing (4106106 Tr., 
p.13, L.22 - p.17, L.3). Significantly, at no time during this exchange did Buss's 
counsel inform the court that Buss did not have notice of this claim or request the 
opportunity to present additional evidence in support of the claim. Not only does this 
suggest that the notice argument has not been preserved, see Mann v. Cracchiolo, 
38 Cal.3d 18, 27, 210 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765 (Cal. 1985) ("It is well settled that the 
appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion and his or her opposition to the 
motion on its merits is a waiver of any defects or irregularities in the notice of the 
motion." (citations omitted)); Low v. Henrv, 221 S.W.3d 609, 617-19 (Tx. 2007) (to 
preserve objection based upon lack of notice party must "bring the lack of adequate 
notice to the attention of the trial court at the hearing, object to the hearing going 
forward, and/or move for a continuance"),' but it also conclusively shows that there 
was no surprise or prejudice. 
Indeed, at no time during the hearing did Buss request additional time to 
submit evidence or otherwise indicate that there was a basis for his conclusory 
assertion that he would have claimed self-defense. It is clear from the record that 
Buss's attorney understood that the court was concerned with the lack of facts in his 
petition regarding self-defense. Buss's counsel concedes that the petition does not 
allege facts that support prejudice. Nevertheless, despite this confession, there was 
no assertion that a factual basis existed or that Buss could allege supporting facts if 
The state acknowledges the waiver arguments were rejected by the Court of 
Appeals in DeRushe v. State, 2007 Unpublished Op. No. 708, *4 (Idaho App., 
December 12, 2007) and Anderson v. State, 2007 WL 3227294, *3 (Idaho App., 
Nov. 2, 2007), relying on Franck-Teel v. State, 743 ldaho 664, 752 P.3d 25 (Ct. App. 
2007). However, the Supreme Court has recently granted the state's requests for a 
review of DeRushe and Anderson. 
given the opportunity to amend the petition. Consequently, there is no merit for 
Buss's claim. 
E. Buss Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Presentinq Facts In His Petition 
Showing The Claimed Deficient Performance Preiudiced Him 
Buss apparently claims that even if he received sufficient notice the district 
court erred by dismissing his petition for not providing facts that support his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. (Appellant's Brief, p.36.) In an attempt to get 
around his petition's deficiencies, Buss claims "the record does contain some 
evidence to support Mr. Buss's allegation that he was prejudiced by his trial 
counsel's advice, & that he would not have pled guilty in the absence of counsel's 
deficient performance." (Appellant's Brief, p.36.) Buss's argument misses the mark. 
In order to survive summary dismissal, a post-conviction petitioner must 
present evidence in support of his petition sufficient to make "a prima facie case as 
to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of 
proof." Berq v. State, 131 ldaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998). Furthermore, 
the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application must be in the form of 
evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 
ldaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowaer v. State, 132 ldaho 681, 684, 
978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). The lower court is not required to accept either 
the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or 
the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 ldaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 
110, 112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125 ldaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 
1994). "If the applicant fails to present evidence establishing an essential element 
on which he or she bears the burden of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate." 
Mata v. State, 124 ldaho 588, 592, 861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Thus, here, were the claim is ineffective assistance of counsel, per Strickland 
v. Washinston, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), Buss had a burden at the district court 
level of showing both that his attorney's performance fell below a standard of 
"competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases" and that the defendant was 
prejudiced as a result. Demonstration of prejudice requires a showing of "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Id. When applying the prejudice prong to a 
case involving the entry of a guilty plea, the petitioner must also show that counsel's 
deficient performance "affected the outcome of the plea process" in that "the 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). That is, a defendant must show that the 
subject matter of the mistake constituted "an important part of his decision to plead 
guilty." McKeeth v. State, 140 ldaho 847, 851, 103 P.3d 460, 464 (2004); Haves v. 
State, 143 ldaho 88, 93, 137 P.3d 475, 480 (Ct. App. 2006). A petitioner's mere self- 
serving assertion that he would not have pleaded guilty absent the mistake need not 
be accepted by the trial court sitting as a fact finder. Id. Buss failed to carry his 
burden in this case. 
As noted above, Buss conceded to the district court that his petition was 
deficient with regard to Strckland's second prong: 
THE COURT: Remember I separated them [Strickland's two 
prongs]. And at this point, based on my question with Mr. 
Bevilacqua, I've kind of come to the conclusion that for the 
purposes of this hearing, I'm going to assume he was wrongfully 
advised. That may not be the end result, but I'm going to do that. 
The question then becomes, assuming he was wrongfully advised, 
has he addressed whether or not he had a legitimate self-defense 
argument? 
MR. STOSICH: And I would have to say to the Court that he hasn't 
done that to fully notify that these are the reasons that I believe 
self-defense was available to him. 
THE COURT: That's my concern. 
MR. STOSICH: I think that that's true under the petition, 
(4106106 Tr., p.16, L . l l  - p.17, L.1.) The district court concluded Buss failed to meet 
his burden: "Buss has not provided any facts that support an argument for self 
defense or justifiable homicide" and consequently, "Buss has not proved that he was 
prejudiced by trial counsel's alleged advice (&, that he would not have pled guilty)." 
(#33180 R., p.37.) Buss cannot point to anywhere in the record where he submitted 
to the district court facts that supported a claim of self-defense. Consequently, Buss 
has not met his burden of showing the district court ruled erroneously on the matter. 
Buss attempts to minimize his petition's deficiency by arguing that "the record 
does contain some evidence to support Mr. Buss's allegation that he was prejudiced 
by his trial counsel's advice." (Appellant's Brief, p.36.) Buss misses the point. It 
was his burden of submitting facts supporting a claim of self-defense in his petition. 
His ability to identify facts now is inconsequential to whether he met his burden of 
submitting a petition that could withstand summary dismissal. 
Nevertheless, even if this Court considered the facts Buss identifies now, 
those facts would still have fallen short of meeting Buss's burden of submitting facts 
supporting a claim of self-defense. The sole basis for Buss's argument is the state's 
offer of proof at the change of plea hearing where the prosecutor gave the following 
testimony: 
And the victim in this matter believed that the defendant 
owed some money, so he approached the defendant and began to 
inquire about the money. An argument ensued. The victim raised 
his voice, and there were some statements made to the effect of, 
pay me the money or you'll have to shoot me. You'll have to shoot 
me. 
The defendant had a High Point 9mm semiautomatic gun. 
The argument lasted a very brief duration, at which time the 
defendant raised the firearm and it discharged. The bullet 
penetrated Mr. Thompson's skin in the mid-abdomen area. 
(#30499 12/22/03 Ch. Plea Tr., p.13, L.23 - p.14, L.9.) Contrary to Buss's 
assertions, this offer of proof is insufficient in overcoming Buss's burden of 
establishing a basis for self-defense. Pursuant to statute, homicide is justifiable 
when "resisting any attempt to murder any person or to commit a felony, or to do 
some great bodily injury upon any person." ldaho Code § 18-4009. Appellate courts 
have made clear, however, that self-defense requires the defendant show he 
"subjectively" believed he was in "imminent danger of great bodily harm" based on 
the circumstances. State v. Turner, 136 ldaho 629, 634, 38 P.3d 1285, 1290 (Ct. 
App. 2001). Here, an argument over money and a statement "you'll have to shoot 
me" do not meet that standard. 
In Turner, the defendant argued the court erred in not giving a jury instruction 
on self-defen~e.~ The defendant was involved in an argument with the victim after 
A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on every defense or theory of 
defense having any support in the evidence. State v. Hansen, 133 ldaho 323, 328, 
986 P.2d 346, 351 (Ct. App. 1999). 
the victim came into the defendant's home. & at 634, 38 P.3d at 1290. The 
defendant, who was in a wheelchair, went to his bedroom and assembled a gun. Id. 
The defendant returned to the living room where the defendant was sitting on the - 
couch. Id. He told the victim, "Now who you calling a fucking liar." & The victim 
said something to the effect of, "You better get me before I get you." & Following 
that statement the defendant shot the victim. & The district court concluded, based 
on these facts, that there was insufficient evidence to support a theory of self- 
defense, and therefore, that the district court was not required to give a self-defense 
jury instruction. Id. The appellate court upheld that determination. d. 
Buss, just like the defendant in Turner, was the one holding a hand gun. Just 
as in Turner, a fight preceded the showing of the gun by the perpetrator to the victim. 
Mr. Thompson and the defendant in Turner made similar responsive statements -- 
"You'll have to shoot me" compared with "You better get me before I get you." In 
neither case was there any indication that the defendant was in imminent danger of 
great bodily harm. Thus, here, just as in Turner, there is no factual support for a 
theory of self-defense. Accordingly, even if the court were to consider these facts, 
facts never submitted to the district court or alleged in Buss's petition, they are facts 
insufficient to establish a claim of self-defense and, therefore, insufficient to establish 
prejudice. 
In sum, Buss failed to meet his burden of submitting, to the district court, a 
petition that set forth facts supporting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Further, even if this Court were to consider the facts submitted for the first time on 
appeal, those facts fail to meet Buss's burden of showing prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order of 
summary dismissal. 
DATED this 17th day of Se~tember 2008. 
~ e p 6 t ~  Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of September 2008, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
SARA B. THOMAS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
Deputy Attorney General 
